

## ONLY A DIALOGUE CAN SAVE US: THE DIALOGICAL CHARACTER OF HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPTION OF DESTINY (GESCHICK)

*Research Article*

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### **Abstract**

The focus of this paper is Heidegger's approach to the question of destiny. That approach in one sense is in sharp contrast to the fatalist tradition, in another appears to presume ineluctability. This seemingly contradictory position can be reconciled with reference to Heideggerian terminology. Through an analysis of affined terms such as dialogue, truth, correctness, Dasein (there being), logos (Word), legein (speaking), fate, being-in-a-world, facticity, historical perception, historiography and disclosedness, the paper aims to utilize this possibility and discover "authentic destiny of man". The main questions dealt in this regard are what the nature of the force of destiny is, how far it extends and by virtue of what it pursues its course. By narrowing down the subject into the history of thought, something that can be tackled by Heidegger's works, the argument departed from Heideggerian way of doing philosophy: Establishing dialogue with the history. In order to reach a fair and tenable explanation for the validity and influence of such a method, necessary examples are cited throughout the article. The main finding that emerged from this research was that ambiguity as the common outcome of dialogues creates a space for the suspension of the customary meaning and acknowledgment of a whole new one. This space is where the paths of history change profoundly. This explanation model also let us to rethink thinker as the one who creates history, is sustained and also beset by it. Only thereby could we make sense of static and dynamic aspects of destiny together.

**Keywords:** Heidegger, destiny, dialogue, conversation, history, fate.

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### **Bizi Yalnızca Bir Diyalog Kurtarabilir: Heidegger'in Kader Kavramsallaştırmasının (Geschick) Diyalojik Karakteri**

#### **Öz**

Bu makalenin merkezi Heidegger'in kader konusuna yaklaşımıdır. Bu yaklaşım bir taraftan kaderci gelenek ile bariz bir tezat arz ederken, diğer taraftan mukadderata teslim olmuş gözükten argümanlar içerir. Bu çelişik gibi duran iki durum terminolojik bir analizle daha makul bir düzleme kavuşabilir. Bu imkânı, diyalog, hakikat, doğruluk, Dasein, logos, konuşma, kader, dünya-içinde-varlık, olgusalılık, tarihsel idrak, historiografi ve varlığa açıklık gibi kavramlar üzerinden değerlendirmeyi hedefleyen bu çalışma, "insanın otantik kaderi"ni keşfetmeye çalıştı. Kaderin faaliyet alanı, hudutları ve işleyişi gibi meseleler bu minvalde ele alınırken çalışmanın sahası, Heideggerci külliyyatın yani düşünce tarihinin sınırları içinde kaldı; böyle olunca temel çerçeveyi Heidegger'in doğru düşünme şekli olarak önerdiği "diyalog" çizdi. Peki, bu metot ne kadar geçerli veya ne kadar etkin? Bu sorunun kaçınılmaz olarak örnekler üzerinden ilerleyen cevabının ulaştığı en temel bulgu ise şu oldu: Tüm diyaloglar doğası gereği belirsizdir ve bu belirsizlik eski ve köhne anlamların yeni ve taze anlamlarla değiştirilmesine fırsat tanır. Bu fırsat kullanıldığında ise oradan bir kader doğar. Kaderi böyle izah edersek, düşünürün nasıl olup da kadere hem şekil verip, hem de onun tarafından kuşatılıp meftun edildiğine dair bir fikrimiz de olabilir. Kısacası yukarıda bahsi geçen çelişik durum, kaderin statik ve dinamik yönlerinin böyle bir izah modelinde açılmasıyla bir dereceye kadar aşılabilir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Heidegger, kader, diyalog, muhavere, tarih, yazgı.

## **INTRODUCTION**

What would be the headlines that name the era we are living in? Who decides the way we think? How do we interpret the concepts that came down to us from different traditions of scholarship? Who decides the zeitgeist? Between various explanation models (causality, coincidence and destiny) address these and similar questions, contemporary German philosopher Martin Heidegger prefers to tie different components of history with the factor of destiny. As a central concept of medieval philosophy, destiny is usually associated to the proposition that "God is the cause of everything there is." According to

this, all events that have happened, happening or will happen foreordained by the will of God. Heidegger per contra, treats the subject outside the borders of theology and philosophy of religion and thus diverges from the beaten track. For him, destiny both in personal and national level is a matter of history of Being; therefore not a cosmic or divine power that manifests itself as a binding obligation that pervades human practice neither is a matter of dispensation. It is rather an objective process of appropriation. This article is an effort towards discovering the dynamics, structure and determinants of this process.

### 1. *Alethic Structure of Destiny*

In the lecture he gave on Parmenides, Heidegger distinguishes two different words that have been used for truth: *veritas* and *aletheia*. Whereas the former means “correctness and validity,” the literal translation of the later is “un-concealedness.” Truth as *veritas*, comes with an opposition between correct-incorrect, valid-invalid poles.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, the second notion, which Heidegger claims to be “as old as philosophy itself”<sup>2</sup> indicates that truth manifests itself as “conflict” *a natura*, provided that un-concealedness is “wrenched from concealment and is conflict with it.”<sup>3</sup>

With a general orientation toward the corpus of Heidegger, we easily become persuaded that “untruth belongs to the essence of truth”<sup>4</sup>,

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<sup>1</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 198-202.

<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995), 30.

<sup>3</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*. Translated by Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992.), 26.

<sup>4</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Truth*. Translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010), 144.

a claim that can be reformulated as metaphysics and authentic thinking together permeates the primordial essence of truth. Some of the historical examples of such a reciprocity can be listed as following: (i) Subjectivity within which every being becomes an object determines an appropriate epoch in the history of being,<sup>5</sup> just like “the advent and development of nihilism” that holds that there is no such thing as knowledge.<sup>6</sup> (ii) Mythological thought is neither weakness of spirit,<sup>7</sup> nor a primitive mode of consciousness incapable of attaining at philosophical level. It is instead, the factor that made early German Romanticism and a new mythology mentioned by Hegel in “The Oldest Systematic Programme of German Idealism” possible.<sup>8</sup> (iii) The historical fact that meaning of Being is unresolved, inadequately formulated and forgotten<sup>9</sup> as a result of metaphysical tradition has paved the way for *Being and Time* and let it reawaken an understanding for the question. This is so because the oblivion to the ontological difference was by no means the abandonment of thinking.<sup>10</sup> (iv) After *Being and Time*, the burden of revealing the meaning of being is cast upon poets. Hölderlin, according to Heidegger declares that mission in

<sup>5</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Hegel's Concept of Experience." In *Off the Beaten Track*, Edited by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 144.

<sup>6</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Nietzsche's Word: God is Dead." In *Off the Beaten Track*, Edited by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 158.

<sup>7</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Translated by Richard Taft. (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1997), 180.

<sup>8</sup> Miguel Beistegui, *Heidegger & the Political: Dystopias*. (London: Routledge, 1998). 161

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 19.

<sup>10</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Anaximander's Saying." In *Off the Beaten Track*, Edited by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 275.

those verses: “But where danger is, grows / The Saving power also.” In other words, where the frenziedness of technology entrenches itself everywhere, it fosters the growth of the saving power which is poetry.<sup>11</sup>

What is that binds objectivism to nihilism, mythology to speculative metaphysics, metaphysics to non-metaphysical thinking and danger to saving power? According to Heidegger, it is the destiny of Being that makes its way over beings in abrupt epochs of truth.<sup>12</sup> Epochs are counter-destiny of one another: “Night gives way to day, and the day to night, ... to darkness light is the counter destiny.” This reciprocity is also found in winter and summer, temper and calmness, sleep and waking, youth and age, birth and death, fame and disgrace, etc.<sup>13</sup> From those examples we can confer that what binds them together and make one the counter-destiny of the other is not a power that transcends both, but this reciprocity *per se*. When looked that way, we can no longer call Greeks as a specific nation or civilization; they rather represent the dawn of destiny in which Being illuminates itself and its essence unfolds historically. Heidegger annotates, ancient Greece, scholastic thought, Enlightenment and modernity on the basis of basic movement of *aletheia*. When beings are illuminated; Being withdraws. The realm of error is established that way. But it is also how destiny holds the seeds of concealment of Being. “Without errancy, there would

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<sup>11</sup> Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology." In *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, Edited by William Lovitt, Translated by William Lovitt. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), 35.

<sup>12</sup> Heidegger, "Nietzsche's Word: God is Dead", 157.

<sup>13</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Beginning of Western Philosophy*. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz. (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2015), 9.

be no connection from destiny to destiny: there would be no history.”<sup>14</sup>  
Being always speaks as destiny, through and via tradition.<sup>15</sup>

At first sight, to enunciate history as destiny may seem adding another chapter to the theological argument (“Whatever happens, happens according to a Divine plan”) on the question. Heidegger’s affirmation that things do not happen by chance or accident nonetheless does not refer to God’s providence. Yet, the connection is left undecided. But meanwhile eschatology of being is sharply distinguished from theological or philosophical theses and thought is thought in a way corresponding to the phenomenology of spirit. On the other hand, the phenomenology of spirit is ironically an epoch in the eschatology of being as well.<sup>16</sup>

How does destiny speak? How does it differentiate one word from another; for example, objectivism from nihilism, mythology from speculative metaphysics, metaphysics from non-metaphysical thinking? Firstly Heidegger claims that the transition is not governed by dialectical or any kind of universal laws.<sup>17</sup> Secondly, Heidegger avows, “Destiny pursues its course untroubled.”<sup>18</sup> Those two statements seem to be uncompromising in the light of frequent understanding. If there is a smooth process and Heidegger observes so, how come we cannot speak of a general trait present in the epochs of this history or a

<sup>14</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*. Translated by David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi. (New York: Harper Collins, 1984), 26.

<sup>15</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. (New York: Harper Row Publishers, 1969), 51.

<sup>16</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 18.

<sup>17</sup> Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*. 67.

<sup>18</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Why Poets?" In *Off the Beaten Track*, Edited by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 204.

law guaranteeing the process? Given the fact that “difference always belongs to the destiny of being”<sup>19</sup>, one can claim that it has to manifest itself; this is a must. This obligation, as Heraclitus has thought, Parmenides has experienced and the etymology of the word *aletheia* affirms, comes from the fact that “self-concealment reign at the heart of disclosure.”<sup>20</sup> But still this obligation leaves the questions of how this fateful yielding occurs and by what means *lethe* gives way to *aletheia* or *vice versa* unanswered. The explanation to be provided on destining of the duality must be neither universal nor dialectical.

## 2. Conceptual Framework: Fate and Destiny

In order to find out how *lethe* gives way to *aletheia* and thus discover how truth reveals itself, the etymology of *aletheia* may be useful and clarifying. The word with an implicit negativity due to the prefix “-a”, implies something lacking. Heidegger's reference to Greek experience echoes this account of negativity:

“Truth is understood by the Greeks as something stolen, something that must be torn from concealment in a confrontation in which in a confrontation in which precisely φύσις strives to conceal itself. Truth is innermost confrontation of the essence of man with the whole of beings themselves. This has nothing to do with the business of proving propositions at the writing desk.”<sup>21</sup>

Missing piece here seems to be “the essence of man”. Truth, to reveal itself, demands the engagement of man as a whole (not just his rationality). On the other hand, full devotion or perfect concentration would not suffice to reveal truth, not even gain an insight to it. Because

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<sup>19</sup> Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, 17.

<sup>20</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 100.

<sup>21</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 29.

truth, when taken with this fundamental meaning, has the power of concealing itself as well and thus is only in part rooted in the fate of man.<sup>22</sup>

Truth has two components, one, within and one beyond man. It is then possible to assert that fate has also two components one dynamic and one static. When one says “it is just fate”, this statement is generally received as “we cant do anything on this,” or sometimes met with total rejection: “there is no such thing as fate.” But Heidegger’s conception lies in between; neither eliminates freedom, nor presumes an endless range of possibilities that enables man to invent things from scratch.<sup>23</sup> To frame this, he employs the nuance between two words; fate (*Schicksal*) and destiny (*Geschick*).

As thrown into the world, *Dasein* is a factual being. This facticity, being-in-the-world is the impossibility of *Dasein*. Man has no control over the conditions he is sent into. He cannot change his birth of place or date or the culture he inherited, neither he can choose another native language.<sup>24</sup> More importantly he cannot change the fact that he will die.<sup>25</sup> Essential structures of everyday human existence are centered in disclosedness,<sup>26</sup> an idea Heidegger elucidates through three phenomena, of idle talk (*Gerede*),<sup>27</sup> curiosity (*Neugier*)<sup>28</sup> and ambiguity (*Zweideutigkeit*).<sup>29</sup> These constitute “falling prey” (*Verfallen*) that is to

<sup>22</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 29.

<sup>23</sup> Richard Polt, *Heidegger: An Introduction*. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 102-103.

<sup>24</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 164-169.

<sup>25</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 219-247.

<sup>26</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 49-59.

<sup>27</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 157-159.

<sup>28</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 159-162.

<sup>29</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 162-164.

say everydayness of *Dasein*'s existence.<sup>30</sup> In this mode, where “*Dasein* is lost in its world”, dominated by public interpretedness, absorbs itself in the “they” (*das man*),<sup>31</sup> beings are precisely discovered but also distorted, on the other hand being toward beings is uprooted. This mode sends what was previously discovered “back again into disguise and concealment.”<sup>32</sup> The diurnal characterization of *Dasein* designates “untruth”. This is the static aspect of fate (*Schicksal*).

*Dasein* is, on the other hand a “thrown possibility, a free being in this thrownness”<sup>33</sup> as those possibilities are both limited by and drawn from the heritage. But it is crucial to note that there is no such thing as “being closed off and covered over.” These ontically negative value judgments in its existential and analytical use exclusively belong to the everyday *Dasein*. In fact, “untruth” exists equally fundamental as “truth” *ab initio*: Being towards beings has not been extinguished, as beings are not completely concealed. “They show themselves, but in the mood of illusion.”<sup>34</sup> This ontological clarification of truth provided by Heidegger brings forth two mutually inclusive accounts: “*Dasein* is in the truth” and “*Dasein* is in untruth.” Heidegger's dual characterization of human existence thus opens a path from illusion and distortion to discoveredness, from untruth to truth. By explicitly and essentially appropriating himself to what has already been discovered and defending it against illusion and distortion *Dasein*, wrest truth from

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<sup>30</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 204.

<sup>31</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 118-123.

<sup>32</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 204.

<sup>33</sup> Vincent Vycinas, *Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*. (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 45.

<sup>34</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 204.

beings; beings are thus torn from concealment.<sup>35</sup> And this is the dynamic aspect of fate.

On the other hand, the path from untruth to truth is obviously not a solitary one. Truth is already discovered by others, as it is also concealed by others and became an illusion and distortion. This emphasis firstly leads us to the analysis of being-in-the-world that came with three objects in *Being and Time*: 1-the world in its worldliness,<sup>36</sup> 2- being a self and being with others,<sup>37</sup> and 3- being-in as such.<sup>38</sup> The second one, the co-originary structure of *Dasein*, “being-with” (*Mitsein*) implies the existence of “others” but in a way different from the conventional meaning of the word. Of course I share the world with others but in this analysis, “other” is not person from whom I distinguish myself, but rather the person from whom I mostly do not distinguish myself. The preposition of “with” thus comes to mean a kind of sameness.<sup>39</sup> Factual *Dasein*, in his mode of being with, neither think or miss, nor need the “other” forasmuch as others are disclosed in *Dasein*.<sup>40</sup> Not only others are lost in *Dasein*, but also *Dasein* is lost in others, or with the aid of terminology of *Being and Time*, *Dasein* is entangled in *they* (*das man*.) When *Dasein* absorbed himself in the *they*, it is dominated by public interpretedness,<sup>41</sup> his understanding is shaped by an anonymous *they*. But besides this inauthentic and conformist mode, *they* plays a positive and constitute role in the understanding of

<sup>35</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 204.

<sup>36</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 59-107.

<sup>37</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 107-123.

<sup>38</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 123-169.

<sup>39</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 111-112.

<sup>40</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 116.

<sup>41</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 204.

the world, as Hubert Dreyfus points out.<sup>42</sup> If to discover is to appropriate oneself to what has already been discovered or discoveredness is always a kind of robbery,<sup>43</sup> then the path from untruth to truth is via *they per se*. On this account free act is not a solitary one. Fate of *Dasein* is shaped in a co-historizing process. That is how and why “*Dasein*’s fate (*Schicksal*) is essentially bound up in the destiny (*Geschick*) of a people.”<sup>44</sup> By projecting upon his factual there and disclosing his factual possibilities, *Dasein*’s fate takes a share in destiny.

As opposed to discussion of “fate” held in individual terms, Heidegger takes the question of destiny on the historical level, but not in the sense of occurrence of a chain of events. According to him, the question is “What call has directed the mode of thinking to the λέγω (legein) of the λόγος (logos)?”<sup>45</sup> For example, what is that directs discussion topics of our day? Or, who did decide the linguistic turn? Why did Aristotelian logic come out of date after 2500 years? As Richard Polt asks, who did determine the set of issues that each generation shared and how come people responded those issues with varying opinions? The only chance that enables the readers follow Heidegger’s discussion on fate is to understand this finite freedom: “For Heidegger, destiny comes to light through ‘communicating’ and ‘struggling.’ When we articulate the issues that face us and wrestle with

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<sup>42</sup> Keller Pierre, *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 161-163.

<sup>43</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 204.

<sup>44</sup> Christopher Fynsk, *Heidegger: Thought and Historicity* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 45.

<sup>45</sup> Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?* Translated by Glenn J. Gray. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 164.

competing interpretations of these issues, a shared decision and direction can emerge.”<sup>46</sup> Videlicet, while the issues we face and wrestle dictates a specific mode of thinking, it implies possible turns as well.

Heidegger compares Plato’s approach to the nature of truth to that of Leibniz and concludes that they are not identical though same. There is one basic nature that manifests in different ways.<sup>47</sup> The question of how this one basic nature manifests itself on different epochs and thinkers, may guide us to the opening section of *Being and Time*:

“Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of meaning of being. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression of ‘being’? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question.”<sup>48</sup>

Who is in charge of bringing the time when there is no answer to the question of being and the time when an understanding for the meaning of this question is reawaken to a juncture? How does truth prevail untruth? For Heidegger, it is an undisputed fact that the “fateful character of being is destined to such thinking.”<sup>49</sup> This perspective calls destiny into the realm of comprehension. Destiny is no more a celestial matter alien to thinking or a binding obligation that pervades human practice.

### 3. History as Destiny of Being

*Dasein* is mostly lost in *they* (*das man*), dependent upon a world

<sup>46</sup> Richard Polt, *Heidegger*, 103.

<sup>47</sup> Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, 165.

<sup>48</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, xvii.

<sup>49</sup> Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, 165.

and made unrecognizable by ambiguity.<sup>50</sup> Thrownness, lostness, dependency and unrecognizability are factual states that characterize *Dasein* as being-in-a-world. Heidegger enlist examples that indicate facticity: “to have to do with something, to produce, order and take care of something, to use something, to give something up and let it get lost, to undertake, to accomplish, to find out, to ask about, to observe, to speak about, to determine...” and calls these deeds as various kinds of “taking care of.”<sup>51</sup> He afterwards elaborates “care” on a plan and in great detail throughout the work.<sup>52</sup> *Dasein*, as a factual being, is absorbed and entangled in what it takes care of.<sup>53</sup> In other words, “one is, after all, what one takes care of.”<sup>54</sup> Along these lines, Heidegger sets forth the ontological problem of history as an existential problem<sup>55</sup> and the proposition “*Dasein* is historical” subsequently turns into an existential one. Consequently, the need to illuminate the question in terms of (authentic) temporality becomes undisputable. Here one also needs to distinguish the concept of “temporality” from its connotations “space” and “time”, yet they both constitute another basic attributes of *Dasein* corresponding to temporality. What is at stake, as far as *Being and Time* is considered, is existential dimension of that “spatio-temporal” determination. Temporality as interpreted existentially, is “the meaning of being of care.”<sup>56</sup>

The factual states that characterize *Dasein*’s being-in-the-world

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<sup>50</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 351.

<sup>51</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 53.

<sup>52</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 169-213.

<sup>53</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 356.

<sup>54</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 296.

<sup>55</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 350.

<sup>56</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 362.

(thrownness, lostness, dependency and unrecognizability) compels him to see things in one particular way. In other words, being-in-a-world, is to be encircled by the *world* and bound by a fate. Heidegger gives couple of outstanding and supporting examples on various texts that would demonstrate what it means to be encircled and subject to a destiny: (i) Greeks did not question, did not ask about *aletheia*. The reason why the concept did not at all enter their field of view was not a lack of power but the existence of original power of remaining faithful to the destiny meted out to them.<sup>57</sup> (ii) Nature (φύσις) was the main field of interest in antiquity but not arbitrarily. *Phusis* means, “prevailing that prevails through man himself, a pre-vailing that he does not have power over, but which precisely prevails through and around him.”<sup>58</sup> It was the destiny of Greeks to experience being as *phusis*.<sup>59</sup> (iii) The authority of Aristotle manifests itself as logic and takes the statement of “logic knows” for granted. The rule of definition (*definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*) and definitions that follow this rule (such as *homo animal rationale*) extend the fate of Aristotle.<sup>60</sup> (iv) “The later students of the schools of Plato and Aristotle were not much more noteworthy than the late Megarians.” Although Megarians were of the same rank with these contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle, they

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<sup>57</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected Problems of Logic*, Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992.), 107.

<sup>58</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 26.

<sup>59</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, 112.

<sup>60</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Basic Concept of Aristotelian Philosophy*. Translated by Robert M. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2009), 226-227.

are forgotten. This is also fate.<sup>61</sup> (v) Plato and Aristotle could have been forgotten as well but survived through various schools and interpretations. Everything belonging to Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy has turned into curriculum of schools. Scholastic philosophy was the fate of Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy.<sup>62</sup> (vi) And the orientation of those philosophies toward the idea of God gave rise to Christian theology. The history of philosophy becomes identical to ontology (or theology from Aristotle to Kant through the agency of the idea that in which God is the supreme being, *summum ens*).<sup>63</sup> (vii) Just because history is shaped with the movements and turns of destiny, Heidegger finds the relation of the object to the objectness that is grasped transcendently by Kant incorrect but essential and preparatory for future thinking.<sup>64</sup> (viii) Today technology with its unavoidable character as a mandate exists as a destiny.<sup>65</sup> Heidegger's contemporaries seemed to him commandeering everything into assured availability. Heidegger calls what he says to be the main characteristic of modern way of thinking *Gestell* (rift-design).<sup>66</sup>

All these examples demonstrate that there is a cave of each

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<sup>61</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Aristotle's Metaphysics, 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force*. Translated by Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995.), 139, 140.

<sup>62</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 35.

<sup>63</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982), 29.

<sup>64</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*. Translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999, 178.

<sup>65</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars: Protocols, Conversations, Letters*. Translated by Franz Mayr and Richard Askay. (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 297.

<sup>66</sup> Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of Work of Art." In *Poetry, Language, Thought*, Edited by Albert Hofstadter, Translated by Albert Hofstadter. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971), 83.

epoch of human history. That cave limits our horizon as beings show their presence within that horizon. To be in a world is hence to be in the cave. But Magda King notes that it would be misleading to take this as the essence of the world. World, beyond that, is a threshold:

“...beings show itself (in a totally different way) as the being of beings. Since world “is” only an irreducible and unique character of being, and since being only is” in its disclosedness in a factual here-being (da-sein), the possibility of being of world can lie only in its *unity* with here-being as a being-in-the-world.”<sup>67</sup>

To be in a cave is the only possibility of departing the cave. Accordingly, Heidegger’s commentary on Plato’s allegory provides the hints of that way out in four stages: 1- To be unconcealed in the cave, 2- Liberation within the cave, 3- Liberation, 4- Return of the liberated to the cave.<sup>68</sup> *Dasein* when inside the cave sees, for the most part, through the lenses of the surrounding world and in terms of what it takes care of. But Heidegger nevertheless thinks that the connectedness of *Dasein* should not be determined in terms of what is taken care of and experienced. Just because factual *Dasein* is absorbed and entangled in what it takes care of, dispersed in the multiplicity of what happens daily and initially understands its history as world history, it does not mean that history is not beyond the “isolated course of ‘streams of experience’ individual subjects.”<sup>69</sup> The wider horizon offered by Heidegger unites the experiences linked together between birth and death, but also reaches “the opportunities and circumstances that taking care keeps

<sup>67</sup> Magda King, *A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time*. (New York: Suny Press, 2001), 276.

<sup>68</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 101-165.

<sup>69</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 354-356.

‘tactically’ awaiting in advance.”<sup>70</sup> That is the reason why liberation beings when *Dasein* is still in the cave. And also this is the reason, according to Heidegger, why for Plato inside the cave is “a night-like day”, not absolute darkness.<sup>71</sup> While contemplating on the cave and a possible way out, *Dasein* is already out. The prefix of “-Da” of *Dasein*, is the shelter and host of truth. It invites Being (*Sein*) to the realm of beings (*seiende*). Only as history-grounding and abiding in a world, *Dasein* can endure traversal of the widest removals.<sup>72</sup> Following the last example (viii), by becoming aware of the unavoidable character of technology as a mandate, one may remove “the fateful character of something absolute and ultimate which has finally befallen us.”<sup>73</sup> This is the point where *aletheia* prevails. The transition that took place between philosophy of antiquity (ii) and authority of logic (iii) shows us that un-concealment (*aletheia*) is not infinite, neither does concealment (*lethe*).

#### 4. Obscurity of the Paths of Destiny

Heidegger, in his commentary on Plato’s cave allegory quotes *Phaedrus*: “For how could the soul (the essence of man) come into the figure of man if it had not seen what is unconcealed in things?” The assumption that “concealment (cave) is ventless” goes parallel with Heidegger’s conception of *in-der-welt-sein* (being-in-a-world). This is admittedly a historical fact: “Every age and every people has its cave and cave dwellers to go with it.” Giving an example (Kolbenheyer), Heidegger characterizes the cave dweller as “bound to the shadows and

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<sup>70</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 356.

<sup>71</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 157.

<sup>72</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions*, 227.

<sup>73</sup> Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars*, 297.

takes these as the only definitive reality and world... does not see, he cannot and does not want to see.”<sup>74</sup> In another lecture on Parmenides, Heidegger describes what it is to be in that dark:

“They set out on their way without a knowledge of ways and let themselves be led by this lack of knowledge. Their taking in and taking away, their entire apprehension, is now like this, now like that, proceeding to and fro, without direction, at sixes and sevens—πλαγκτός—errantly they take in and apprehend! Led by ignorance of ways, they drift about in errancy (each runs after the others, each always follows the others, and no one actually knows why). They do not at some point first enter into errancy; on the contrary, they are constantly in it and never come out of it. In accord with this is now their fate.”<sup>75</sup>

To drift about in errancy, to be constantly in it with no beginning or an end, and to receive that constant errancy as a fate seems to be in contradiction with what was described in cave allegory of Plato. He has depicted cave as “a night-like day”, rather than absolute darkness.<sup>76</sup> And respectively Heidegger has pointed into the dynamic aspect of destiny via the conception of *aletheia* that presents truth inside untruth and *vice versa*. On the same grounds, Heidegger has called different epochs of history as the counter-destiny of one another. So the allegory also tells us, this is not a total darkness. That one does not see does not necessarily mean lack of sight in as much as truth is rooted in the fate of man.<sup>77</sup> The fourth stage described in Heidegger’s commentary on the allegory is about this fate. In that stage, man differs fundamentally from the other inhabitants of the cave.

<sup>74</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 159-60.

<sup>75</sup> Heidegger, *The Beginning of Western Philosophy*, 95.

<sup>76</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 157.

<sup>77</sup> Heidegger, , *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 19.

Heidegger and Plato diverge when it comes to the question of how transformation occurs. Plato designates the fate-changer as the philosopher, whereas for Heidegger this is the authentic history of man, a fate one cannot shake off even he declares that he has nothing to do with philosophy. And likewise, as opposed to “self-conscious philosopher” of Plato, *Dasein* can surmount a fate and found another without even knowing it.<sup>78</sup> This contrast denotes a second factor besides free will of the liberator. As truth is only in part rooted in man, “truth of philosophizing is in part rooted in the fate of *Dasein*.” Thence, when inside the cave, possibilities of change as well as the predicament are obscure. Dweller, stands before possibilities he cannot predict and is subject to changes he does not foresee.<sup>79</sup> Secondly, for the same reason we cannot take anything as a “general trait always present in the individual epochs of the destiny of Being.”<sup>80</sup> When things put this way, presuppositions, apodictic propositions, absolute certainties and even probabilities fall in esteem. Then one may ask, what is the *Dasein*'s share in this destiny? Or strictly speaking, what kind of philosophizing is that “hovering between certainty and uncertainty in a knowing that we first grow into through philosophizing”?<sup>81</sup>

Philosophizing hovers between certainty and uncertainty. This statement may be divided into two: The ontological status of the thinker and the nature of philosophy. Throughout the discussion on the difference between fate and destiny, truth was cited with its two aspects, one beyond and one within man and that citation has guided us to two

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<sup>78</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 143-4.

<sup>79</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 19.

<sup>80</sup> Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, 17-18.

<sup>81</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 19.

corresponding aspects of fate. *Dasein* cannot change the facts that accompany his ontic existence, such as body, place, time and etc. These are certain. He undeniably has no ontic priority among other beings. “*Da*” of the *Dasein*, on the other hand, refers to the “clearing in which beings stand as a whole, in such a way that in this ‘*Da*’ the being (*Sein*) of open beings show itself and at the same time withdraws.”<sup>82</sup> His ontological privilege is “*Da*” that lets him be grounds for the quest for the meaning of Being. Heidegger, in the seminar he gave on art, uses a pseudo tautology (“*world worlds*”) to show the activity of world and conveys “wherever those decisions of our history that relate to our very being are made, are taken up and abandoned by us, go unrecognized and are rediscovered by new inquiry, there the world worlds.”<sup>83</sup> Those simple and essential decisions to take, to abandon, to recognize, to forget, to rediscover, to relate and to inquire, or as Heidegger calls “self-opening openness of the broad paths”<sup>84</sup> depend on man’s disclosing factual possibilities and relating himself to the truth of Being. Who will take the historical decisions? Which decisions will be taken up, while others will be abandoned? By what means taken decisions will be discovered? These remain uncertain.

In that point, the question becomes complicated considering there are now two determinants of the process of decision-making. Scientific models cannot explain how decisions of our history that relate to our very being are made. This has two reasons. First is, as already

<sup>82</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, 180.

<sup>83</sup> Heidegger, “The Origin of Work of Art”, 43.

<sup>84</sup> Martin Heidegger, “The Work and Truth.” In *Off the Beaten Track*, Edited by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 26.

mentioned, neither of the variables may be known for sure. The idea and the measure of philosophical truth, -as once believed without scrutiny- is mathematical certainty. Some sources refer to the inscription present in the entrance of Academy in this course: “Only those who know geometry may enter”<sup>85</sup> Especially, during the Enlightenment, proceeding from accepted axioms to provable theorems, mathematics was granted the privilege of yielding truth to philosophy. As reported by Heidegger, this begins with as early as Plato and Aristotle and marks the forgetfulness of Being. Gadamer acknowledges Heidegger: “The West begins with early Greek thought and with the development of logic based on declarative propositions.”<sup>86</sup> Heidegger criticizes Descartes for furnishing “philosophical truth with the character of mathematical truth and wrest mankind from doubt and unclarity”.<sup>87</sup> Heidegger, likewise criticizes Leibniz, who is considered to be the first of scientific philosophers, to “take seriously the possibility of scientific legal reform”<sup>88</sup> and thus to contribute to the forgetfulness of Being.<sup>89</sup> The dogma which has passed on from the “philosophical charisma” of Plato to the Scholastic thought or into nominalism and Enlightenment is “Philosophical truth is absolutely certain truth.” Heidegger asks: “Regarding this endeavor concerning

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<sup>85</sup> Christine Phili, "Greece: The Byzantine Period." In *Writing the History of Mathematics: Its Historical Development*, edited by Joseph W. Dauben and Christoph J. Scriba, (Berlin: Birkhauser, 2002), 224.

<sup>86</sup> Hans G. Gadamer and Renato Cristin, *Heidegger and Leibniz: Reason and the Path*. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), viii.

<sup>87</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 16.

<sup>88</sup> Roger Berkowitz, *The Gift of Science: Leibniz and the Modern Legal Tradition*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 17.

<sup>89</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973). 44.

absolute truth and certainty, do we not instead throughout the history of philosophy constantly see one catastrophe after another?" and announces that the catastrophe is so desperate that people do not even notice.<sup>90</sup>

One may then ask, what is the truth of truth if not certainty? Heidegger's delineation of truth as "clearing of being as openness of the midst of beings"<sup>91</sup> requires an inquiry neither subjective nor objective. Only such an inquiry shifts man "into the openness of being, poses him as the one who is exposed to beings (and before that, to the truth of being)."<sup>92</sup> If this is the essential sway of being, the occupation of philosopher may no longer be with accepted axioms, provable theorems or even posed questions:

"Instead, philosophizing is a *fundamental way of being human* that precedes all science. Such a philosopher is the one who has climbed out of the cave, gotten used to the light, and then climbs back down as the liberator of the prisoners. *This* philosopher exposes himself to the fate of death, death in the cave at the hands of the powerful cave dwellers who set the standards in the cave."<sup>93</sup>

Along these lines we also see that why the decisions of our history that relate to our very being cannot be explained with science. Truth demands does not demand just rational faculty but the whole being of man. If broad paths will open themselves to someone, that someone has to open himself to the paths of destiny in the broadest sense as well. When that happens, nothing is known with certainty, not even with probability. Heidegger intends to muffle other beliefs about

<sup>90</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 16.

<sup>91</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy*, 229.

<sup>92</sup> Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy*, 213-214.

<sup>93</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 140.

philosophy as well: 1- a cultural phenomenon, 2- methods self-development, 3- area of scholarship, 4- worldview, 5- opportunity to detach from religion and traditions. Philosophy is rather “a fundamental happening in the history of humanity” in which “a through which the essence of humanity transforms itself”.<sup>94</sup> The question is if not with axioms, theorems or questions then how? To put it another way, how does the essence of humanity transform itself and change the paths of destiny?

### **5. How to Contemplate on History?**

In his letter to Medar Boss, Swiss psychiatrist who is the founder of Daseinsanalysis, we find Heidegger's honest statement on how he perceives his historical position:

“Here I am not speaking with false modesty but only with a daring look ahead to the determined destiny of thinking. The confrontation [of my thinking] with the uncanny power of ‘science’ is still only in its inadequate beginnings. Perhaps even a retreat in thinking is necessary to dare the attack, which does not have a warlike character but that of a quiet deprivation of ‘science's’ power.”<sup>95</sup>

In this statement we also find Heideggerian way of looking at past, embrace the present and carry out “a destiny of thinking” into the future. This statement hence has two implications: First is how to read history and the second is how to create it. We see that for Heidegger two are intermingled; they require and follow each other. As *Being and Time* expresses plainly, “Whatever has a history, in this way can at the same time make history.”<sup>96</sup> We can re-read the sentence as follows: We

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<sup>94</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 158-9.

<sup>95</sup> Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars*, 288.

<sup>96</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 347.

need a history, in order to make history. And this may guide us to the question of why past plays such a critical role in Heidegger's characterization of destiny.

When we think about history as a discipline, we usually think of past events on which we have current evidence. Heidegger retorts history's identification as such and makes a distinction between historiographical consideration and historical reflection. For the former, afore-mentioned premise is valid. The occupation of the historian is the calculation of what has come from the images of the past and introduction of them to the present.<sup>97</sup> This view takes history as something bound by historical facts.<sup>98</sup> But for the later view, history is not an object to be studied scientifically but the manifold paths of destiny to be joined. Before describing the essential steps of this join, a brief mention of the notion of "historical reflection" may be useful. Historical reflection is a creative process in such a way that it is accomplished by not professional historians but creative thinkers from various fields. For example Heidegger finds famous historian Jacob Burckhardt great not for his skills for reading sources, promulgating them or discovering manuscripts but for having a view of the essence of human action, "human greatness, human limitation and human fate" and of course for understanding Being. All these factors united and let him see facts in a new way.<sup>99</sup> This "new way" is different from historiographer's "new interpretation" on a past fact. Former is "bound by that happening on the basis of which facts can arise and be in the

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<sup>97</sup> Heidegger, "Anaximander's Saying", 246.

<sup>98</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, 46.

<sup>99</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 127.

first place” whereas the later is done according to idea of science.<sup>100</sup>

Historiographical perspective exhibits an unquestioned belief in progress. Heidegger gives the example of the velocity of falling bodies on which there is a dispute between Aristotelian and modern science. Former has thought that heavy bodies fall faster than the lighter ones, but as by today we all know that both share the same speed. Historiographic consideration would take the question from a progressive perspective whereas for historical reflection it is the question of how Greeks experienced nature, body, motion, place and time. When the Aristotelian concept of “belonging to a certain place” is also taken into account, there we find deeper conception of nature, instead of insufficient observation.<sup>101</sup> Although this way of seeing things can prevent whiggism and save the thinker from the mistakes of anachronism, one might perceive it to be over flexible, speculative and thus inadequate. Heidegger disagrees that perception: “Historical reflection is subject to a higher and more rigorous law than historiography is, although it might seem, judging by appearances, that the reverse obtains.”<sup>102</sup>

What is the law historical reflection is subject to, putting another way, what is the more accurate way of “judging the appearances”? By rejecting progressive chronology and observing that development may occur as both rise and fall, *Being and Time* defines history as the inventory of “the whole of beings that change ‘in time,’ the transformations and destinies of humankind, human institutions and

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<sup>100</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, 46.

<sup>101</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, 47-48.

<sup>102</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, 46.

their ‘cultures,’ in contradistinction to nature that similarly moves ‘in time’.”<sup>103</sup> Human destiny, along with human institutions and cultures is hence included in the patterns of history. This denotes the fact that *Being and Time* is primarily a *Dasein* analytic. Only thereby is *Dasein* historical in it’s being; circumstances, events and destinies are ontologically possible.<sup>104</sup>

After *Being and Time*, destiny continues to be the key concept in tracking the status of historical occurrences whereas we observe a major shift from *Dasein* to Being. Heidegger, in one of his later lectures again elaborates on historical reflection and positions it outside the opposition of optimism and pessimism. He depicts *free thinker* as the one who liberated himself from the necessity of choosing between progression and regression and is aware that past is the one and the same with the future. Instead of tracking rise or fall patterns, he “works toward the preparation of a historical existence which lives up to greatness of fate, to the peak moments of Being.”<sup>105</sup>

Some of Heidegger’s works from that so-called “historical reflective” perspective track peak moments of Being and in that regard mention various names. One of them is Nietzsche. Heidegger is certain that the depth and breadth of him is a rare occurrence of history. This occurrence is based on unique necessity and unrepeatability. His task is a fate and cannot be carried out incidentally.<sup>106</sup> This evaluation, at first glance seems to present thought of Nietzsche as an individual accomplishment. Then we may assume, even if it is fate, it is Nietzsche

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<sup>103</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 347.

<sup>104</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 347-348.

<sup>105</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, 50.

<sup>106</sup> Heidegger, *The Beginning of Western Philosophy*, 35.

who worked on that fate. But Heidegger has two obvious accounts that claim otherwise. Firstly on the contrary of the idea that nihilism is founded by Nietzsche, it is a historical movement, not “just any view or doctrine held by just anyone”.<sup>107</sup> It thus cannot be attributed to the fate of one individual but should be viewed under the light of destiny of Western Peoples. Not just nihilism but also persona of Nietzsche is the outcome of “entire inner and outer history of a man”.<sup>108</sup> Nietzsche is one of these peak moments, not only because he saw the Western thought was about to reach its end, but also because he was standing in that end.

Nietzsche is not the only name referred to in this context. Plato, Aristotle, Kierkegaard, Kant and Hölderlin are cited for their unlikeness in the history of Western thought. We can confidently add Heidegger's name to the list and by now ask the question what their hallmark is. What distinguishes them from a much longer list is as conceptualized in *Being and Time* as “authentic historicity.”

“It became clear in terms of the phenomena of handing down and retrieve, rooted in the future, why the occurrence of authentic history has its weight in having-been. However, it remains all the more enigmatic how this occurrence, as fate, is to constitute the whole ‘connection’ of Dasein from its birth to its death.”<sup>109</sup>

Via this unified phenomenon of time<sup>110</sup>, that is the structural frame of temporality of *Dasein*, Heidegger tries to overcome the

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<sup>107</sup> Heidegger, "Nietzsche's Word: God is Dead", 163.

<sup>108</sup> Heidegger, *The Beginning of Western Philosophy*, 35.

<sup>109</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 353.

<sup>110</sup> This perspective is derived from Greek cosmology in which there exists a distinction between different conceptions of time and inspired by Greek Gods, Aion, Chronos and Kairos. Whereas the first symbolizes eternity of cosmos, the second is clock time. Aion, with its hyper-time dominion is responsible of bringing different

conventional (chronological or vulgar as he calls<sup>111</sup>) concept of time, its connotative concepts such as “immanent”, “transcendent”, “subjective” and “objective” and their hierarchical implications. The mode of authentic care, which Heidegger relates to temporality, would rule out those positions. Heidegger, on the other hand, when enumerating time ecstasies, mentions the future firstly on the grounds that future has priority in the ecstatic unity<sup>112</sup> and writes that “having-been arises from the future in such a way that future that has-been (or better in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself.”<sup>113</sup> On the same grounds he accuses historiography for destructing the future and thereby damaging our historical relation to the advent of destiny.<sup>114</sup> The adequate relation that will carry us to the advent of destiny or “occurrence of authentic history” continues to be non-scientific but also not over flexible or speculative.

### 6. Phases of the Advent of Destiny

Heidegger draws a direct line from metaphysical perspective to the modern science<sup>115</sup> On this line, we find Kant’s position of *definition (logical perfection)* in conjunction with *knowledge of the matter* of Aristotle.<sup>116</sup> Correspondingly the perplexity of Plato’s *Sophist* on the

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pieces of time (seasons, years etc.) In contrast to Aion, Chronos divides time into pieces (minutes, eras etc.) Kairos, on the other hand, has nothing to do with quantitative nature of time; it is neither linear nor sequential. Kairos by moving back and forward, spread its wings to both past and future. It stands in the intersection of time and space and as such becomes the symbol of “right time”.

<sup>111</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 371-399.

<sup>112</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 302 .

<sup>113</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 300.

<sup>114</sup> Heidegger, "Anaximander’s Saying", 246.

<sup>115</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, 48.

<sup>116</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 11.

meaning of being reaches out today.<sup>117</sup> In the didactic poem by Parmenides, the goddess who “greet[s] him as he arrives at her home in the course of his travels”<sup>118</sup> begets an alternative conception of truth (*aletheia*) to the conventional one (*veritas*) for Heidegger. These and numerous similar *creative* relations found in Heidegger’s thought go along with his self-portrayal sentences written to Medar Boss. Heidegger is undeniably “looking ahead to the determined destiny of being” and thus holding one of the peak moments of destiny with other mentioned names. By what means all these connections are established? Who provides the grounds of possibility of this historical reflective act to the thinker? The way offered and practiced by Heidegger is “a dialogue engaged with the history of thought”. He, nevertheless anticipates that scholars would find this “unscholarly violation of what they take to be facts”, while philosophers see it “as a baffled descent into mysticism.” Yet Heidegger is confident that “destiny pursues its course untroubled by that.”<sup>119</sup> Such course apparently has three chapters: 1- Suspending the customary, 2- listening to unspoken in spoken and 3- responding.

### **6.1. *Suspending the Customary***

The new light Heidegger shed on the philosophical concepts that we receive imperiously is so vibrant but yet contested. Heidegger in fact has made critics uncomfortable with his etymological investigations. Those analyses have been found either incorrect or irrelevant. For example, pointing out that the only place *aletheia* occurring as “un-

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<sup>117</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time* xvii.

<sup>118</sup> Heidegger, *Parmenides*, 4-5.

<sup>119</sup> Heidegger, "Why Poets?", 204.

concealedness” is Hesiod’s *Theogony*, Paul Friedlander argues that Heidegger’s etymology have no foundation in Greek literature.<sup>120</sup> G. B. Smith expands the critique by including other Greek terms, *physis*, *ousia*, *logos*, *nomos*, *eidos*, *idea*, *doxa*, *polemos* and *noein*<sup>121</sup> and describes such an attempt “bizarre and idiosyncratic.”<sup>122</sup> But as William Large expresses “this is not a question of etymology for the sake of it; or even discovering the truth about Greeks.”<sup>123</sup> And Heidegger would perhaps classify all these endeavors “historiographic” because of their retrospection. The justification of Heidegger’s etymology can be *mutatis mutandis* derived from the argument that “the future is the origin of history.” This argument has two divisions: Historical is not the past and historical is not the present. The first indicates what Heidegger’s analyses are not about. They intend to be neither correct nor relevant “since truth as correctness is derivative and since the primordial truth is a projection (*Entwurf*), correctness does not apply to it.”<sup>124</sup> And the second finds what is generally accepted and obvious doubtful, as “obviousness is a very problematic assurance of the legitimacy of an intuition.”<sup>125</sup> The discovery starts by liberating from the customary definitions and tries to reach “the remnants of thought

<sup>120</sup> Vladislav Suvak, "The Essence of Truth (aletheia) and the Western Tradition." In *Heidegger in Russia and Eastern Europe*, edited by Jeff Love, (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 144.

<sup>121</sup> Smith, Gregory B., and Michael Smith, *Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Transition to Postmodernity*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 187-198.

<sup>122</sup> Smith, Gregory B., and Michael Smith, *Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Transition to Postmodernity*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 187.

<sup>123</sup> William Large, *Heidegger's Being and Time: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 13.

<sup>124</sup> Bret W. Davis, *Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts*. (New York: Routledge, 2014), 126.

<sup>125</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, 37.

which lie concealed in the beginning of the history of Being's destiny."<sup>126</sup> For example, in order to catch a sight of *logos* independent from declarative propositions, Heidegger refers to Parmenides and Heraclitus.<sup>127</sup> Another examples are Nietzsche who has invoked the beginning of Greek philosophy in order to make a non-metaphysical inquiry about being, Kant who tried to work out a non-metaphysical Christianity and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* that recaptured ancient doctrine of elements and thus planted the seeds of a tradition that survived up until 16<sup>th</sup> century.

Heidegger believes that onto-theology starting with *prote philosophia* of Aristotle is the destiny of Western thought. Kant who stands in the tradition of holding God is the basic ontological example of being of a being, and primal ground of all beings,<sup>128</sup> is a part of such an interrupted line. This observation supports the claim that being speaks as destiny and permeated by tradition. Heidegger's endeavor to redefine metaphysics as the question that includes the questioner unavoidably, was meant to overcome that tradition.<sup>129</sup> From Heidegger's project and names he cited (Nietzsche, Plato, Aristotle, Kierkegaard, Kant and Hölderlin) we can infer that without suspending the engagement of tradition one cannot reveal the potentials of the counter-destiny.

Casting the obvious aside on the grounds that "the appeal to what has been handed down, the so-called 'tradition', is not the

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<sup>126</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 10.

<sup>127</sup> Gadamer, Hans G., and Renato Cristin, *Heidegger and Leibniz*, viii.

<sup>128</sup> Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 29.

<sup>129</sup> Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" In *Pathmarks*, edited by William M. Neill, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 82.

foundation”<sup>130</sup> seems to be vital for a genuine engagement with the foundation. In order to have a more concrete opinion about such engagement, we can also refer to Heidegger’s contribution to the discussions on the conceptual aspects and goal of the act of translation. Heidegger starts his commentary on Anaximander’s saying by asking question of what the truthful encounter with a historic language is like. For example, what would be the fateful way of translating *physis, ousia, logos, nomos, eidos, idea, doxa, polemos* and *noein*? An overwhelming majority of scholars, of whom Smith and Friedlander are only two examples, find objective and literal translation faithful. In that discussion, Heidegger holds that what deserves faith better is thought *per se* rather than the language that transmit that thought. Having compared the translations of Nietzsche and Diels he concludes, “If a translation is merely literal it cannot be assumed to be faithful. It only becomes faithful when its words that speak out of the language of the matter.”<sup>131</sup> In this statement there are two elements; one the language itself, the second is the language of the matter. Therefore, Heidegger’s etymology of *aletheia*, as Friedlander claims, may have overlooked the ambiguity of the word and chose one of the secondary meanings over the primary ones (reality of being, correctness of apprehension or assertion) or Friedlander may have criticized Heidegger just for the sake of it, as Wilhelm Luther is convinced. There might really be only one text that the word occurs (*Theogony*), or again as Luther opposes there are others as well (in Sophocles and Euripides).<sup>132</sup> But all these

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<sup>130</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, 37.

<sup>131</sup> Heidegger, "Anaximander’s Saying", 243.

<sup>132</sup> Jan. Wolanski, *Semantics and Truth* (Cham: Springer Nature, 2019), x.

discussions are held on philological, lexicological or historical level and obviously do not moved by the matter of the language.

If we cannot “demonstrate the adequacy of translation by scholarly means”<sup>133</sup> and if historical/philological proofs do not carry us beyond the language of the language, how are we supposed to get in touch with so-called matter? Heidegger, again over the Anaximander's saying points out to the possibility of establishing a lively dialogue with the thinkers. This is, he notes, accomplished by two philosophers, Nietzsche and Hegel. However Nietzsche's dialogue seems superficial to Heidegger, while Hegel shares the “prevalent conviction concerning the classical character of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy.”<sup>134</sup>

### ***6.2 Listening to Unspoken in Spoken***

From Heidegger's assertions so far we can conclude that historical reflection is based on liberation from customary, obvious and generally accepted and of course the literal in this case. We secondly can confer that historical reflection may neither be commonplace nor endorse what was already endorsed but is possible only through suspension of the cumulative knowledge. In other words, in order to establish an authentic engagement with the history of thought we need the wisdom of knowing we do not know. Inspired by the doctrine of Socrates,<sup>135</sup> Heidegger considers silence as the precondition of a fateful encounter with history. He claims that the language of such an encounter is “silent.” Videlicet, one needs to mute if he is meant to receive the language of “the destiny of being.” The process is depicted

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<sup>133</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 57.

<sup>134</sup> Heidegger, "Anaximander's Saying", 243.

<sup>135</sup> Plato, "Charmides." In *The Dialogues of Plato*, edited by B Jowett, translated by B Jowett. (N.p.: Clarendon Press, 1875).

as following:

“For this reason the fragment will never engage us so long as we only explain it historiologically and philologically. Curiously enough, the saying first resonates when we set aside the claims of our own familiar ways of representing things, as we ask ourselves in what the confusion of the contemporary world's fate consists.”<sup>136</sup>

These lines do not only question Western dogma of certainty, but also restates Heidegger’s famous distrust in objectivity. According to him, Being demands the questioner to expose himself to beings. His redefinition of metaphysics, with the assumption that the metaphysical question includes the whole being of the questioner is also relevant in the sense that they are all based on the idea that Being speaks *pro se*. Once the saying resonates as the voice of Being instead of the voice of an archaic fact, then it will “no longer sound like an assertion historically long past.”<sup>137</sup> Only through listening this voice, one can translate a historical account faithfully.

All these discussions revolving around the notion of translation are evidently associated with a more important matter, true nature of philosophy. When reviving the question of “what is called thinking?” Heidegger rules out traditional style of thinking and goes on to claim that the idea forming process is actually a listening process. What we are meant to hear in such a listening is unspoken in spoken. The shift from Dasein to Being, is plainly visible in this projection. Whereas *Being and Time*’s emphasis was on thinking, in the later works “to think is before all else is to listen, to let ourselves be told something and not

<sup>136</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 57.

<sup>137</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 18.

to ask questions.”<sup>138</sup> This relocation of the center of gravity we observe here, also gives us grounds to see things in a whole new epistemic perspective.

In a lecture he gave on the concept of *logos*, he quotes Heraclitus: “The highest that man has in his power is to meditate [upon the whole], and wisdom [lucidity] is to say and to do what is unconcealed as unconcealed, in accordance with the prevailing of things, listening out for them” and arrives at the conclusion that *logos* is the saying of the unconcealed. This points out to what *logos* and *legein* already mean. Heidegger makes it clear that discourse and saying are not the essence of *logos*.<sup>139</sup> Nietzsche’s statement, “The wasteland grows; woe to him who hides wasteland within”<sup>140</sup> can be interpreted in a fashion supporting this reasoning. Nietzsche here observes the decline of the West and thus speaks out what is not spoken out. But this happens only because he let himself be told something and not asked questions at the first place. In support of Nietzsche’s dictum “listen with the third ear”,<sup>141</sup> Heidegger affirms that hearkening “has nothing to do with the ear and the glib tongue, but instead means obediently following what *logos* is.”<sup>142</sup> When solving a problem or analyzing an argument, he similarly looks after the first time the related concepts were put forth. In this act he is only concerned with “the meaning, the possible

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<sup>138</sup> Eric S. Nelson, "Heidegger and Carnap: Disagreeing About Nothing." In *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, edited by François Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 150.

<sup>139</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 28.

<sup>140</sup> Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, 55.

<sup>141</sup> Walter Kaufman, *Discovering the Mind: Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber*. Vol. 2. (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 53.

<sup>142</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. (Tübingen: Yale University Press, 2000), 137.

standards, the necessary goals, the ineluctable powers, and that from which all human happenings begin.”<sup>143</sup> Those claims alleged by Heidegger and Nietzsche underline epistemic significance of obedience, faculties beyond five senses, submission, ineluctability and a destiny that all humans are subject to. All these arguments alleged implicitly restate that truth requires the involvement of man as a whole.

Truth demands the unconditional engagement of man in order to reveal itself. This engagement is not a formal refutation or demonstration of mere incorrect points as Heidegger states when concluding his commentary on Hegel’s logic.<sup>144</sup> A quick look at his interpretation of Nietzsche’s brief but characteristic statement “God is dead” can clarify what engagement is and is not. The dictum is usually either associated with atheism and nihilism or Nietzsche’s insanity. Nietzsche, when using the concept of God, casts aside the metaphysical tradition to which we actually owe the content of the concept. And likewise Heidegger sets aside the assumptions of tradition on God. He instead heads towards the intention of Nietzsche. He tries to “think ‘God is dead’ in the way that it is intended.”<sup>145</sup> Nietzsche’s declaration concerns the sunset of an aged tradition. And Heidegger’s intention here is to avoid the obvious and to liberate from the conventional meanings of the words and proceed to the foundation. Once one is by the foundation, the language of the matter (in that case Nietzsche’s thought *per se*) speaks to uncover the unspoken in spoken. To hear it depends on distancing from “the rash opinions that obtrude themselves at once

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<sup>143</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, 37-38.

<sup>144</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 62.

<sup>145</sup> Heidegger, "Nietzsche's Word: God is Dead", 160.

at this terrible statement.”<sup>146</sup> Therefore only those who could distance from historiographical accounts can initiate “the meaning, the possible standards, the necessary goals, the ineluctable powers, and that from which all human happenings begin.”

### **6.3. Responding**

What is said so far is not about just anyone but “historical man, which means the one who creates history, is sustained by history, and is beset by history.”<sup>147</sup> Creation of history, being sustained and beset by it are only possible in a mode *Being and Time* calls “resoluteness”. Resoluteness as one of the central themes<sup>148</sup> of the work is primarily presented as the authentic potentiality of *Dasein*. The concept has in fact a twofold resonance; one is “primordial truth” and the other is “the eminent mode of the disclosedness of *Dasein*.”<sup>149</sup> This dual resonance might tell us why resoluteness is both active and passive. The act of listening starts with decision for suspending the conventional meanings and creating a space for the acknowledgement of a new one but does not guarantee the emergence of a new one. Emergence of meaning is not up to man; yet meaning does not come out without the silent consent of man. That “primordial truth” requires the submission of man in order to manifest; yet man needs to distance himself from the obvious to receive the it. Heidegger restates that claim from a different perspective in another text: “The world is the self-disclosing openness of the broad paths of the simple and essential decisions of a historical people.”<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> Heidegger, "Nietzsche's Word: God is Dead", 160.

<sup>147</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, 181.

<sup>148</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 247-279, 282- 287.

<sup>149</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 273.

<sup>150</sup> Heidegger, "The Origin of Work of Art", 47.

Paths may close or open themselves, but it is historical people and their decisions that will broaden the paths.

Heidegger in the same text on Hegel's logic avows that engagement is scission based on decision. History-making decisions are possible by setting apart from the customary: "Engagement as steadfastly letting fate hold sway... The innermost and broadest history is neither left to accident nor left to the placidity (our people will once again want science) of the customary."<sup>151</sup> Heidegger rules out science and surprisingly turns to poetry. One reason for that may be the fact that thinking soberly in what is said in a poem is a good way to experience what is unsaid in said.<sup>152</sup> And the other is the idea that thinking is essentially poetizing. They both speak out what Being dictates.<sup>153</sup> Resisting the common belief that "poetry is a rich storehouse for philosophy"<sup>154</sup> Heidegger ties poetry (along with authentic thinking) to the history of Being. According to him, entering upon the course of the history of being, initiates a dialogue between thinking/poetry and history of being. This engagement is not only for poets but also for us the listeners. In Freiburg seminar Heidegger has accordingly advised audience to read the poem entitled Rhine River poem and uttered "a mysterious repose radiates from it, a destiny, a stillness, which we must reach in order to endure".<sup>155</sup>

This advice again affirms the claim that destiny is a matter of listening. When man accomplishes proper hearing, -Heidegger also

<sup>151</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 62.

<sup>152</sup> Heidegger, "Why Poets?", 204.

<sup>153</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 19.

<sup>154</sup> Heidegger, "Why Poets?", 204.

<sup>155</sup> Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars*, 241.

uses the term “wise hearing” alluding to the wisdom of knowing that we do not know- this is fateful.<sup>156</sup> But fate here should not be seen as a cut and dried plan which we have to abide with; it is instead the authentic potentiality of *Dasein*. Knowing that we do not know is “not an ascertained fact, but as insight into the necessity of having to act.”<sup>157</sup> Referring to afore-quoted example, Nietzsche not only saw that West have came to end but also through that seeing he carried it to its end. His philosophy marks that end. Only through such a dialogue accomplished by Nietzsche, “between thought and what this thoughtful saying says can it be translated.”<sup>158</sup> Quoting Nietzsche’s word (“God is dead”), that gave the destiny of two millennia of Western history Heidegger makes the following humble statement: “We must not think that we will alter this destiny by a lecture about Nietzsche's statement or even learn to know it only adequately.”<sup>159</sup> But on the other hand only through the genuine dialogue between Heidegger’s thought and what Nietzsche’s thoughtful saying says, Nietzsche’s word was translated properly.

Translation in this context shall not be thought in terms of mere intellectuality. It is not a correspondence took place between two colleagues. As E.S. Nelson notes as well, Heideggerian conception of dialogue gives us an opportunity to rethink what correspondence in fact is. To translate a historical text means being claimed and responding to that claim. This conceptualization, in like manner, serves to clarify the difference between hearing and hearkening. The later is inevitably

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<sup>156</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 68.

<sup>157</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 62.

<sup>158</sup> Heidegger, "Anaximander's Saying", 247.

<sup>159</sup> Heidegger, "Nietzsche's Word: God is Dead", 160.

“responsive hearing and interpretative confrontation.”<sup>160</sup> According to this, reading saddles reader a responsibility. When that responsibility is taken, reader is obliged to get involved with and subsequently interpret the text/saying. Heidegger stresses that “every interpretation is a dialogue with the work/saying” however a dialogue would be halting and fruitless if it confines itself to the literal meaning. Sticking by the literal meaning would then be committing violence and crudity.<sup>161</sup> What is proposed instead is an engagement in which speakers of the dialogue not only involve but also lead each other. Such a dialogue furthermore leads the speakers into the unspoken.<sup>162</sup> The frequent understanding would relate this emphasis on the unspoken with a tendency towards favoring arbitrariness and in that regard possibly refer to Heidegger’s assertion, “engagement is not an ascertained fact”. But this assertion does not assume a total arbitrariness. As a matter of fact, only in a dialogue “questions be clarified and arbitrariness stopped.”<sup>163</sup> It is true that such a thoughtful dialogue does not have an agenda but it is still bound by laws. Those laws are, on the other hand, more easily violated. “In a dialogue the possibility of going astray is more threatening, the shortcomings are more frequent.”<sup>164</sup> Platonic dialogues or poems that do not exhaust its full meaning or never come to an end are the examples of “thoughtful dialogues” in that sense. Obscurity attracts and deserves further thinking. Accordingly, Heidegger concludes his commentary on

<sup>160</sup> Eric S. Nelson, "Traumatic origins: History, Genealogy, and Violence in Heidegger and Nietzsche." In *Heidegger & Nietzsche*, edited by Babette Babich and Holger Zaborowski, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012). 390.

<sup>161</sup> Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, 196.

<sup>162</sup> Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, 178.

<sup>163</sup> Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars*, 36.

<sup>164</sup> Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, xx.

Parmenides dialogue as following:

“This unending dialogue is no failing. It is a sign of the boundlessness which, in and for remembrance, nourishes the possibility of a transformation of destiny. But anyone who only expects thinking to give assurances, and awaits the day when we can go beyond it as unnecessary, is demanding that thought annihilate itself.”<sup>165</sup>

This is also the reason why “engagement is not an ascertained fact but necessity of having to act.” Engagement is essentially uncertain because of its potential meanings and possibilities. If a meaning is secured by dictionary, has been ready in advance by one of the speakers; in other words “when everything is secured” -Heidegger notes- “It is not an engagement.”<sup>166</sup> When the speakers lead each other and are guided towards the possibilities of the unspoken, what comes on the scene is neither chaos nor relativism/skepticism but counter play of fate and decision.

### **7. Dialogue: Forming Figure on the Ground of Destiny**

In his letter to Medard Boss, Heidegger expresses his appreciation for the correspondence took place between two and then prioritizes dialogue over giving/listening to lectures, reading/writing books and writes, “Therefore, let us hope for a dialogue.”<sup>167</sup> So far, the dialogue is presented as an alternative to *mot a mot* translation and its distinction from mere correspondence was emphasized. Dialogue, as an engagement imposing the necessity of having to act, exposes “oneself to the necessity of fate”<sup>168</sup> and will push not only the borders of the conventions but also one’s comfort zone outward. This might be the

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<sup>165</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 101.

<sup>166</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 63.

<sup>167</sup> Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars*, 239.

<sup>168</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 62.

reason why Heidegger warns that a thoughtful dialogue is no way comfortable; on the contrary, it will unavoidably turn into a disputation of a rising acrimony.<sup>169</sup> Suffering, on the one hand draws the entire being of man to the matter of thinking, and let him transform. And that is, in Nietzsche's terms, activation of the third ear or in Heidegger's terms hearkening, obedience, ineluctability and submission to destiny.

While interpreting one of Hölderlin's poems ("Out of the range of motives of the Titans") Heidegger underlines the essentiality of suffering in the process of hearing. Transition into another being is possible only through readiness for painful hearing. Because, -he adds- one grasps when suffering; projects and extends himself over into broad expanses.<sup>170</sup> When a response is given, this is not a literal translation of what is heard, however the dialogue brings "the same to the language." When that sameness is achieved, Heidegger claims, a thoughtful dialogue between today and yesterday is automatically fulfilled.<sup>171</sup> The conception of sameness here should be interpreted as "accord" or "appropriates", rather than identity. It is a state where one turns into the other while continues to be self. Heidegger's example might be insightful to embody such a state:

"If we stubbornly insist on thinking Greek thought in a Greek manner, this is by no means because we intend to produce a portrait of the Greeks as a past humanity intended to be, in numerous respects, more accurate. We seek what is Greek neither for the sake of the Greeks nor for the advancement of science. We seek a dearer dialogue not for its own sake but solely for the sake of that which wishes to come to language in such a dialogue, provided it comes of its own accord. This is that same which, in different ways, is

<sup>169</sup> Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, 54.

<sup>170</sup> Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, 152.

<sup>171</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 23.

destined to concern both the Greeks and us. It is that which brings the dawn of thinking into the destiny of the West. It is as a consequence of this destiny that the Greeks first became, in the historical sense, the Greeks.”<sup>172</sup>

That “same” (as in observed in the comparison between Plato’s and Leibniz’s notions of truth) which fatefully concerns both sides of the dialogue, is the sole ground enabling them to be true to self. Only via that fatefulness (*Geschick*) do the sides be themselves in the historic (*geschichtlich*) sense. Therefore engagement is not an ascertained fact but a necessity to act, or as stated in famous Der Spiegel’s Interview (“Only a God can Save Us”) “thinking is not inactivity but is in itself the action which stands in dialogue with the world mission (*Welt-geschick*)”<sup>173</sup> This reasoning also lies behind the Heidegger’s approach to German people’s destiny. In that interview when he was asked if he assigned a special task to Germans. He proposed a dialogue with Hölderlin in reply.<sup>174</sup> Correspondingly in another letter written to Boss, he declared that Hölderlin’s poetry is a destiny waiting for the moment of response.<sup>175</sup> When proper hearing is accomplished, a destiny arises from the dialogue between thought and poetry.<sup>176</sup> Dialogue, Heidegger asserts, is different in each case, as the language is proper to both of them “The dialogue of thinking with poetry aims to call forth the nature of language.”<sup>177</sup> By activating the “unspoken in spoken” poetry seizes

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<sup>172</sup> Heidegger, "Anaximander's Saying", 253.

<sup>173</sup> Heidegger, "Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel's Interview." In *Philosophical and Political Writings*, edited by Manfred Stassen, translated by John D. Caputo and Maria P. Alter. (New York: Continuum International Publishing, 2003), 42.

<sup>174</sup> Heidegger, "Only a God Can Save Us", 44.

<sup>175</sup> Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars*, 265.

<sup>176</sup> Heidegger, *Existence and Being*. (London: Henry Regnery Company, 1949), 253.

<sup>177</sup> Heidegger, "Language in the Poem: A Discussion on Georg Trakl's Poetic Work." In *On the Way to Language*, Edited by Peter D. Hertz, Translated by Peter D. Hertz. (Toronto: Perennial Library, 1959), 160-161.

a necessary possibility. Heidegger etymologically establishes the same argument as following: “When mortal Λεγείν is dispatched to the λόγος, ήομολογείν occurs.” And when that occurs fateful comes to pass.<sup>178</sup> Logos by gathering mortals and Being, spoken and unspoken, fate (*Schicksal*) and destiny (*Geschick*), becomes the grounds for the sameness and sends everything to its own.

### CONCLUSION

In every dialogue there are things left unspoken. This marks the tacit admission of our bewilderment and incognizance. We are mute, because we do not know. We are mute, because we are amused. Secondly, this is the assurance of the continuation of the dialogue. We cannot easily detach ourselves from something that does not exhaust its full meaning. Even when we merely think and do not utter a word, we are still in that dialogue, captivated by it. This is might be the reason why Plato believed that thinking is soul’s dialogue within itself. Dialogue with a contemporary or a historical figure initiates the necessary steps of the fateful course of thinking. This paper, by limiting itself with the later, observed those steps as suspending the customary, listening to unspoken in spoken and responding to it.

As far as Heidegger’s path of thinking is concerned first step seems vital. Heidegger thinks that today philosophy is lagging behind not only sciences but also behind its own tradition. This is due to neither inattentiveness nor apathy but a temporary blindness determined by the destiny. Only by casting aside the metaphysical tradition one can properly get in touch with the matter of thinking. Strictly speaking,

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<sup>178</sup> Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, 71.

hearing is achievable only through faithful listening. When that is achieved, a passion for response emerges and leads us to a interpretative confrontation. The question here is this, why this model is different from usual scholarly activities? Establishing a lively dialogue, as opposed to reading/writing books, launching articles or giving/listening lectures, creates blind spots. Both parties meet in some kind of sameness but something is also left in the air for them. All conversations are left undecided without fail. Moreover, they are unpredictable. Those two characters create an immense challenge for destiny to move. And for Heidegger this seems to be the only opportunity for diverging from the beaten track. Heidegger's works, when read under this light, are the concrete outcomes of embraced opportunities. Heidegger, by means of dialogue, discovered a hidden link connecting unspoken elements of history of thought, yet for him this history is not mere chronicle of varying opinions and theories but history of Being awaiting participation. In a dialogue, the response is neither a crude rejection, nor a neglectful approval but always an interpretation. There neither is an impulse for sublating. Hence dialogue does not develop into dialectics. It moves with discovering and creating links as this unending movement nourishes the possibility for a change in destiny. This might be one of the reasons why Heidegger and the thinkers to whom he referred with regard to essentiality of dialogue hold the peak moments of destiny.

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